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Abstract: We study the role of institutional development as a causal mechanism of history affecting current 
economic performance. Several indicators capturing different dimensions of early development in 1500 AD 
are used to remove the endogenous component of the variations in institutions. These indicators are adjusted 
with large-scale movements of people across international borders using the global migration matrix of 
Putterman and Weil (2010) to account for the fact that the ancestors of a population have facilitated the 
diffusion of knowledge when they migrate. The exogenous component of institutions due to historical 
development is found to be a significant determinant of current output. By demonstrating that the 
relationship between early development and current economic performance works through the channel of 
institutions and that better institutions can be traced back to historical factors, the results of this paper shed 
some light on how history has played a role in shaping long-run comparative development. 
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1. Introduction 
 This paper studies the role of institutions as a channel through which historical development 
influences current economic outcomes. The issue of whether history matters for current economic 
performance has received considerable attention from recent contributions to the literature on long-run 
comparative development. For example, Nunn (2008) provides evidence showing that Africa’s external 
trade in slaves had a permanent negative impact on economic development in the region. Comin et al. (2010) 
measure the level of technology for the periods up to 1000 BC, 1 AD and 1500 AD and find that historical 
rates of technology adoption show a high level of persistence over the last three millennia. They also find 
that the 1500 AD indicator of technological sophistication is most strongly associated with per capita 
income today.
1
 Putterman and Weil (2010) demonstrate that the length of state history and the timing of 
agricultural transition are robust predictors for current levels of income.
2
 Their findings also indicate that 
the predictability of these indicators improves substantially once they are adjusted for the location of the 
current populations’ ancestors in 1500 AD, hence suggesting that cross border migration has played an 
influential role in early development through the dissemination and exchange of knowledge. 
 While the importance of these historical factors for growth in the very long run and for 
understanding the variation of income levels across countries today have been well documented in the 
literature, it is not clear if these effects run through some intermediate channels rather than affect growth or 
income levels directly. One important channel through which history can affect economic outcomes is 
institutions (Nunn, 2009; Putterman and Weil, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Building on the 
earlier contributions of North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981), who highlight the fact that countries 
with good institutions are able to use their factors of production more efficiently to achieve higher levels of 
income, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that 
differences in economic performance today are due to colonial rule that created completely different 
institutional development trajectories. Hence, their argument concentrates on institutional development as a 
causal mechanism through which colonial rule influences economic development.  
 These studies, along with the subsequent contributions of Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005), among others, focus almost exclusively on the effects of the European expansion and 
colonialism since the sixteenth century that resulted in the evolution of institutions, and hence the different 
development paths for former colonies. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that historical factors 
                                                          
1
 Using more recent and comprehensive data on the diffusion of technologies, Comin and Hobijn (2010) show that technology 
adoption lags have shortened substantially in the past few decades, and the timing of adoption of new technologies over the last 
two centuries accounts for at least 25 per cent of the cross-country differences in per capita income. 
 
2
 See also the previous contributions of Burkett et al. (1999), Putterman (2000), Bockstette et al. (2002), Chanda and Putterman 
(2005), Chanda and Putterman (2007) and Putterman (2008). 
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prior to the major colonization of modern times have also played an influential role in the evolution of 
institutional development. This paper investigates how current income can be traced to historical forces 
through the process of institutional development by analysing the specific roles of an early development of 
successful agrarian systems, the historic presence and formation of polities and state societies, the level of 
ancient technological sophistication, the ease of adopting the frontiers’ technologies due to genealogical 
similarity and geographical proximity, and the extent of economic prosperity in the early days. 
 The idea that good institutions are precipitated by the above historical forces is not new. For instance, 
Diamond (1997) proposes that superior modes of agricultural production following the transition from 
hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture, or the Neolithic transition, led to the accumulation of food 
surpluses. The availability of excess food thus enabled the creation of a class of specialists who could 
engage in writing legal codes, defining property rights, and developing initial social and political structures, 
which formed the basis for subsequent institutional building.  
 The emergence of early polities and state societies is another major contributing factor for 
institutional development. A longer history of statehood, which is often associated with stronger political 
integration, is deemed conducive to improving institutional capacity because efficient and stable states have 
more competent bureaucrats who can design effective rules of law (Bockstette et al., 2002). Effective states 
can also foster linguistic unity that harmonizes social interaction and facilitates the adoption of social norms 
that reduces the risks of creating weak and fragile states (Chanda and Putterman, 2007).  
 Furthermore, Mokyr (2003) argues that, historically, institutions and technology have a strong 
interplay. The effect of technology on institutions can work through several mechanisms. For instance, 
technological development in the military altered the balance of power between ordinary people and 
government, thus enabling the creation of centralized states that subsequently provided the rule of law in the 
modern world. Rapid technological change had also contributed to institutional development when a 
“factory system” emerged during the Industrial Revolution. Workers were expected to follow certain rules 
such as being cooperative, punctual, disciplined and willing to accept guidance, all of which lay the 
foundations of present day institutions.     
 We argue in this paper that the effects of early development on institutions and how current 
performance is shaped by historical events are not two unrelated consequences, and hypothesize that the 
relationship between history and current income reflects the effect of early development working through 
institutions. This idea is clearly articulated in a recent study by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who 
provide a number of historical examples to demonstrate that current performance is not historically 
predetermined. Rather, it is an outcome of institutional development occurring during critical historical 
turning points that changed the development trajectory permanently and led to different long-run outcomes. 
(4) 
  
In this manner, history shapes institutional development, explaining the broad differences in economic 
prosperity around the world. 
 To test the above hypothesis, we regress current income on previous decade institutions, and 
instrument the latter using seven different indicators of pre-modern development, henceforth PMD, in 1500 
AD, including the timing of agricultural transition, state history, the historical rate of technology adoption, 
geographical proximity to the regional frontier, genealogical similarity to the global frontier, population 
density, and their first principal component to capture various dimensions of early development. These 
indicators are adjusted for the effects of global migration using cross-border population flows data of 
Putterman and Weil (2010) to account for the fact that when people migrate they bring with them their 
know-how and ideas. Current institutions are measured as the first principal component of the six 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank, namely voice and accountability, political stability, 
rule of law, control for corruption, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness.  
 Our first-stage regressions of current institutions on the above-mentioned individual indicators of 
PMD deliver economically and statistically significant effects. Technological adoption rates and the overall 
early development indicator (i.e., the first principal component) are found be the most significant 
determinants of institutions. The significance of these migration-adjusted estimates also suggests that the 
diffusion of knowledge or innovation through cross-border migration has been crucial for institutional 
development. Our results, based on the two-stage least squares estimator, provide evidence that the 
exogenous component of the variations in institutions extracted by PMD measures in 1500 AD significantly 
determines current income. 
 These estimates rest on the key premise that institutional development is the mechanism through 
which historical development in the pre-modern eras influences current economic performance. Hence, the 
exclusion restriction implied by our instrumental variable approach is that PMD in 1500 AD has no direct 
impact on current income, other than through institutional development. Test results of over-identifying 
assumptions indeed suggest that the effect of PMD on income only operates through institutions, thus 
satisfying the exclusion restriction. A major concern with this identification strategy, however, is that our 
measures of PMD could be correlated with some variables, which may have a direct effect on current 
economic performance. To ensure that our results are not driven by omitted factors, we control for a number 
of factors which are potentially correlated with PMD and current income. The estimates are remarkably 
consistent when we include controls for cultural norms, human capital, early institutions, legal origins, 
geographic factors, and continent fixed effects.  
 Our work is closely related to the influential study of Acemoglu et al. (2001), who use data on 
European settler mortality rates mostly in the 19
th
 century to provide evidence that changes in the 
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institutional development resulting from European colonialism has a persistent effect on today’s income. 
Instead of focusing on the role of the European expansion, we show in this paper that historical forces 
predating European settlement such as the timing of agricultural settlement, the historic presence of 
supratribal polities, the adoption rates of primitive technology, the accessibility to historical frontiers’ 
technologies due to geographical and human genetic barriers, and past economic prosperity could have a 
long-term impact on current performance through influencing the subsequent institutional development. 
This paper is also related to the important contribution of Putterman and Weil (2010), who show that an 
early transition to agriculture and a longer state presence are both associated with higher levels of current 
income, and that state development is positively correlated with several measures of institutional quality, 
including executive constraint, expropriation risk and government effectiveness. However, the mechanism 
explaining how agricultural transition and state history, as well as other dimensions of early development 
considered in this paper, are causally related to income and institutions is not addressed in their study. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. The next section presents and discusses 
the empirical estimates. Several robustness checks are provided in Section 4. Section 5 conducts some 
further analyses to throw some light on how early development is linked to current income through various 
dimensions of governance and how different sectors of early technological development affects subsequent 
institutional development. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 This section describes the key variables used before presenting the empirical estimates in the next 
section. A summary list of all variables used, their definitions and data sources is provided in the appendix 
(see Table A1). Summary statistics and the correlation structure of these variables are also presented in the 
appendix (see Tables A2 and A3, respectively).  
 
2.1 Quality of institutions 
 The quality of institutions is a summary measure of several key dimensions of institutional 
development constructed using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, including: 1) voice 
and accountability; 2) political stability; 3) rule of law; 4) control for corruption; 5) regulatory quality; and 6) 
government effectiveness. The data are provided for more than 200 countries over the period 1996-2009. 
These indicators are constructed using a wide variety of different sources, which reflect perceptions of 
governance of survey respondents, public, private and other non-governmental organizations worldwide. A 
detailed description of the methodology used to construct this dataset is provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010).  
(6) 
  
 Data presented in percentile rank terms ranging from 0 to 100 for each country are used, where 0 
corresponds to the lowest ranked institutions. Ranking scores for these six indicators are then averaged over 
the period 1996 to 2005 and combined into a composite index using the method of principal component 
analysis. This variable is then divided by the maximum value in order to give a measure that varies between 
0 and 1. A larger value for the summary index signifies better institutions or higher institutional 
development. This measure is appropriate for the purpose of our study to provide an overall indicator of the 
quality of institutions that covers major dimensions of institutional development. Alternative measures 
including the social infrastructure index of Hall and Jones (1999) and the the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) composite index of Knack and Keefer (1995) are also used for robustness checks. 
 
2.2 Pre-modern development indicators 
 We consider six related but distinct measures of PMD in 1500 AD as instruments for institutions. In 
addition to using these individual variables, we also extract their first principal component as a summary 
measure indicating the overall earlier development in 1500 AD. The details are as follows: 
 
(a) The timing of agricultural transition [        ] 
The timing of agricultural transition reflects, in 1500 AD, the estimated thousands of years since the 
transition from hunting and gathering systems to sedentary agriculture had occurred. A higher value 
implies an earlier transition to agriculture. Using a large number of sources, the transition years are 
estimated by Putterman (2006) based on the first year in which more than half of a human’s calorific 
needs were obtained from cultivated plants and domesticated animals. In the sample of 99 countries 
used in this study, the transition to agriculture is estimated to have first occurred in the Syrian Arab 
Republic (10 thousand years before 1500 AD) and last occurred in New Zealand (300 years before 
1500 AD). 
 
(b) State history [          ] 
The early development of political institutions is measured using the state antiquity index of 
Putterman (2004). The index gives a score between 0 and 50 for every fifty years from 1 AD to 1950 
AD to reflect: 1) the presence of a government above the tribal level, 2) whether this government is 
foreign or locally based; and 3) the proportion of the current territory covered by this government. 
State history covering fifteen centuries since 1 AD is calculated as follows: 
 
(7) 
  
           
               
  
   
                  
                                         (1) 
 
where      is the state history for country i for the fifty-year period t. A five percent discount rate is 
applied to each of the half centuries to account for the diminishing effects of political institutions 
formed in the more distant past. The use of alternative depreciation rates such as zero or ten percent 
does not change the results in any significant manner. The resulting index ranges between 0 and 1, 
with a higher value reflecting the presence of a longer state history or more developed political 
institutions.  
  
(c) Technology adoption [           ] 
Comin et al. (2010) provide data for the overall technology adoption rate in 1500 AD. The data 
cover technologies adopted in the following five sectors with a total of 24 state-of-the-art 
technologies: 1) agriculture; 2) transportation; 3) communications; 4) industry; and 5) military. The 
average adoption rate is first calculated for each sector. The overall adoption level is then taken as 
the unweighted average adoption rates for all sectors, which yields an index value between 0 and 1 
for the extent of technological adoption. In the sample of countries considered in this study, 
Paraguay and Uruguay had not adopted any technology in 1500 AD whereas France, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain achieved an adoption rate higher than 0.9. 
   
(d) Geographical proximity to the regional frontier [         .] 
Geographical distance between two countries is estimated using the ‘Haversine’ formula, which 
calculates the shortest distance between two countries on the surface of the globe using their 
longitudes and latitudes. The regional frontier is identified as one of the two countries having the 
highest population density in 1500 AD in each continent. For example, France and the United 
Kingdom are chosen as the economic leaders for Europe, given that they had the highest levels of 
population density in 1500 AD. In this case, the frontier for Switzerland would be France rather than 
the United Kingdom since France is situated closer to Switzerland. Geographical proximity to the 
regional frontier for a country is then calculated as:    
            
           
  where               is the 
geographical distance between country   and its regional frontier    and               is the 
maximum distance in the sample. The results are almost identical if proximity is calculated using the 
largest distance between two countries in each continent instead. Countries located closer to the 
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regional leader have greater opportunity to trade and interact with the frontier, thus facilitating the 
adoption and adaptation of the institutional framework created at the frontier. 
 
(e) Genetic proximity to the global frontier [             ] 
This measure captures the ease of diffusing cultural traits and institutions across countries. Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009) measure genetic distance from the technological leader using the fixation index 
(   ), which reflects the degree of genealogical dissimilarities or historical unrelatedness between 
the population of the U.S. (the leader) and the population of a country under consideration.     takes 
a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that two populations are genetically identical and 1 
indicates that they are genetically unrelated. We modify their data and calculate genetic proximity to 
the global frontier in 1500 AD (i.e. the UK) as    
      
      
 , where        is the genetic distance 
between country   and the global frontier    and        is the largest genetic distance in the sample. 
Data on populations are matched to countries based on their ethnic composition as of 1500 AD. A 
higher value reflects greater genealogical similarity between the global leader and the country under 
consideration in 1500 AD or a shorter period of separation between their populations.  
 
(f) Population density [        ] 
Population density is the total population in 1500 AD divided by land area. It provides a basic 
measure for the level of prosperity, wealth and general well-being of an economy. Higher population 
density implies the emergence of populous and affluent societies, which have the resources to build 
good institutions. Data on population and land are obtained from McEvedy and Jones (1978) and the 
World Bank’s World Development indicators, respectively.  
 
2.3 The composite indicator of pre-modern development 
In principle, these measures should be highly correlated as only countries with high agricultural 
productivity, well-developed political institutions, sophisticated technological development and low 
developmental diffusion barriers are relatively prosperous and could support a denser population, 
and vice versa. The correlation coefficients are all highly significant and show an average value of 
0.6 (see Table A3). Hence, using all these indicators in the same regression may pose some 
estimation difficulties. Our identification strategy may also be considerably weakened with the use 
of too many instruments. One solution for this problem is to construct a summary indicator that 
captures all these dimensions of early development using the first principal component of these six 
(9) 
  
indicators. Accordingly, all measures are standardized so that they represent deviations from the 
mean divided by the standard deviation to ensure comparability. The results are very similar if the 
simple average is used instead. The resulting composite index is significantly positively correlated 
with all indicators of PMD, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.7 (population density) to 0.9 
(technology adoption), thus suggesting that it is an appropriate measure of overall early development 
covering all its major dimensions.  
 
2.4 Adjusting for the effects of global migration (ancestry adjustment) 
 In their seminal contribution, Putterman and Weil (2010) highlight that significant movements of 
people across borders due to slavery, colonialism, wars of conquest and voluntary migration over the last 
five centuries may have important implications for comparative development today. Our estimates may 
therefore be biased due to the failure to account for dramatic changes in the composition of population in a 
region following large-scale movements of people. To address this concern, all indicators capturing 
different aspects of early historical development are adjusted using the global migration matrix constructed 
by Putterman and Weil (2010), who provide the estimated proportions by location, in 1500 AD, of the 
ancestors of  each country’s current population. 
Accordingly, the ancestry-adjusted measures of early development are derived by pre-multiplying 
vectors of each early development indicator by this global migration matrix. The resulting migration-
adjusted measures reflect the history of a population’s ancestors, thereby allowing us to check whether the 
diffusion of ideas through cross-border movements of people has been an important channel shaping current 
levels of institutional development. In other words, this exercise sheds some light on whether current 
institutional development is related more to the people who brought in technology, human capital and 
knowledge through cross-border movements than to the actual location where historical development first 
took place.  
The results of performing adjustment for migration on these measures are presented in Figure 1. 
Take agricultural transition as an example. The adjusted and unadjusted values are similar for a large 
number of countries which have experienced little inward migration. However, there are also many 
countries that lie in the northwest quadrant of the diagram. These countries typically have relatively late 
transition to agriculture, and yet their early development has benefited from the ancestors who migrated 
from more prosperous origins. The resulting mean values of all these ancestry-adjusted variables are, on 
average, 15% higher than their unadjusted counterparts, suggesting that the impact of global migration is 
quite substantial. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the composite index of all early development 
(10) 
  
measures across countries. As is evident, the distribution of the level of PMD in 1500 AD is quite dispersed 
across the world. 
 
Figure 1: Migration-adjusted against unadjusted measures of pre-modern development in 1500 AD 
  
  
  
Notes: the above scatter plots illustrate the differences between the migration-adjusted and the unadjusted measures of pre-
modern development in 1500 AD for the 99 countries used in the regressions. Larger values correspond to higher levels of 
economic development during the pre-modern eras. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the 1
st
 principal component of all pre-modern development indicators in 1500 AD 
 
Notes: the above show the levels of pre-modern development in 1500 AD, measured by              , for the 99 countries used in 
the regressions.               is the first principal component of the following standardized measures of pre-modern development, 
all of which are measured as of 1500 AD and are adjusted for the global migration effects: 1) the timing of agricultural transition  
                     , 2) state history                       , 3) technology adoption                        , 4) geographical 
proximity to the regional frontier                       , 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier                          , 
and 6) population density                     .  
 
3. Empirical Estimates 
 The following linear regression model is estimated to investigate how institutional development is 
related to current economic performance: 
 
                  
           (2)
  
where   denotes per capita GDP in 2005 measured in constant 2005 international dollars using PPP rates, 
    is an indicator of the quality of institutions,     is a vector of control variables, and   is an unobserved 
error term.   is the coefficient of interest and is expected to carry a positive sign. Note that     and   are 
likely to be correlated since institutional development is endogenous to income. 
 
 
 
(12) 
  
3.1 Correlation between income and institutions 
 Figure 3 provides the scatter plots and reports the univariate least square regression results of log per 
capita income on institutions for a sample of 99 countries used in the present study. The diagram depicts a 
clear positive relationship between current output and institutions. The regressions results confirm the visual 
impression that there is a very strong and significant correlation between income and institutions, with an 
estimated coefficient of 3.901 on institutions. Using data for all available countries (180 observations) 
produces an almost identical estimate of 3.918 with a similar robust standard error of 0.205 but a slightly 
lower R-squared value of 0.620.  
 
Figure 3: Per capita income in 2005 (PPP) against average quality of institutions (1996-2005) 
 
Notes:     is GDP per capita (PPP) in 2005 whereas     refers to the average quality of institutions over 1996-2005.     is the 
first principal component of the six worldwide government indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2010). Figures in round parentheses 
indicate robust standard errors. 
 
 However, these coefficients cannot be interpreted as reflecting a causal effect of institutions on 
income due to several reasons. First, it is likely that only affluent economies can afford, or are more capable 
of creating, better institutions and so causality can run from income to institutions. Second, there may be 
other unobserved omitted determinants of current income that also correlate with institutions. Finally, 
indicators of institutions may be measured with errors since they are often constructed ex post based on 
survey data (Glaeser et al., 2004), and this may create attenuation that biases the OLS estimate downwards.  
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These problems, however, can be dealt with using an instrumental variable approach by isolating the 
exogenous source of variation in institutions so as to identify the causal impact of institutions on income.  
 
3.2 Instrumental variable regressions 
 Our previous discussion suggests that indicators of PMD are appropriate instruments for institutional 
development. In this case, the variation in institutions that is exogenous due to history will be isolated by 
these instruments from the endogenous variation in institutions due to the unobserved error term. Our 
identification strategy will be valid as long as the PMD measures are uncorrelated with the residuals. In 
other words, PMD is assumed to have no influence on income today other than through its effect on 
institutional development.  
 The two-stage least square estimates of Eq. (2) are presented in Table 1. Here, institutions are treated 
as endogenous and the equation of institutions is specified as follows: 
 
                 
           (3) 
 
where     is an indicator of pre-modern development in 1500 AD and   is the residual.  
 The seven indicators of PMD, which capture different dimensions of early development in 1500 AD, 
will be used individually in the regressions. As discussed previously, all these indicators are adjusted for the 
effects of  global migration in light of the findings of Putterman and Weil (2010) that ancestry-adjusted 
historical development measures have substantially stronger power in explaining variations in long-term 
development across countries. Although all original measures were also considered initially, three of them 
were found to have poor explanatory power, and thus would serve as weak instruments for institutions. 
These results are reported in Table A4 in the appendix. When we regress institutions on both the original 
PMD measures and their ancestry-adjusted counterparts in the same specification to provide a horse race for 
them, as shown in Table A5 in the appendix, only the adjusted measures turn out to be both economically 
and statistically significant. Hence, consistent with Putterman and Weil (2010), the results clearly indicate 
that the ancestry-adjusted measures are  superior to their original counterparts. These findings suggest that a 
country that has more ancestors who lived in prosperous places tends to have better institutions today, 
highlighting the fact that knowledge transmission through migration has played a large part in improving 
institutional development.  
 Panel A of Table 1 reports the 2SLS estimates of our coefficient of interests (   ) from Eq. (2) 
whereas panel B provides the corresponding first-stage regressions (Eq. (3)). The coefficients of institutions 
are found to be very precisely estimated, irrespective of which instrument is used for institutional 
(14) 
  
development. The results suggest that a complete switch from the worst to best institutions could lead to an 
average 5.674 log-points increase in current income. The resulting coefficients are nearly 50% larger than 
those reported in Figure 1, suggesting that the OLS estimates are likely to be plagued by measurement 
errors which subject the coefficients to attenuation bias.  
 
Table 1: Instrumental variable regressions for income, institutions, and ancestry-adjusted PMD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
     7.497*** 6.427*** 5.517*** 5.637*** 5.654*** 4.378*** 5.696*** 
 (1.696) (1.110) (0.495) (1.085) (0.702) (0.411) (0.629) 
R-squared 0.104 0.402 0.573 0.555 0.552 0.682 0.546 
Dep. Var. =     Panel B: 1st-stage results 
                     0.040***       
 (0.015)       
                       0.332***      
  (0.101)      
                         0.693***     
   (0.088)     
                         0.476***    
    (0.146)    
                             0.501***   
     (0.092)   
                         0.016***  
      (0.003)  
                     0.153*** 
       (0.027) 
R-squared 0.074 0.097 0.371 0.120 0.244 0.265 0.277 
F-test on excluded 
instrument  
7.001 
[0.009] 
10.869 
[0.001] 
62.578 
[0.000] 
10.694 
[0.001] 
29.427 
[0.000] 
30.779 
[0.000] 
32.907 
[0.000] 
Endogeneity test  
11.816 
[0.001] 
7.594 
[0.006] 
14.998 
[0.000] 
3.693 
[0.055] 
10.208 
[0.001] 
2.110 
[0.146] 
12.668 
[0.000] 
Notes:               is the first principal component of the following standardized measures of pre-modern development, all of 
which are measured as of 1500 AD and are adjusted for the global migration effects: 1) the timing of agricultural transition  
                     , 2) state history                       , 3) technology adoption                        , 4) geographical 
proximity to the regional frontier                       , 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier                          , 
and 6) population density                     . The total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. The endogeneity test is 
performed using the Wooldridge robust score test. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Figures in round 
parentheses are robust standard errors whereas those in square brackets are p-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 These 2SLS estimates suggest that institutions can explain a larger fraction of variation in income 
across countries. For example, the Central African Republic had a rather poor quality of institutions of 
0.119 out of a total maximum score of one and had a very low level of per capita income of $672. If the 
Central African Republic had an environment that produced a level of institutional quality similar to that 
experienced in Italy of 0.763, then the estimated income of the Central African Republic would be $25,960 
(15) 
  
per person. This new level of income is just slightly below what is enjoyed in Italy now, i.e., $28,282, but 
would exceed those of the Czech Republic ($20,362) and Greece ($24,348) who have quality of institutions 
very close to that of Italy. Hence, improving the Central African Republic’s institutions to the level of Italy 
could result in a more than 38-fold increase in the former’s income.  
 The regressions in panel B also show a very strong first-stage relationship between the PMD 
measures and current institutions. All coefficients of the PMD measures are found to be highly significant at 
the 1% level, and have the intuitive sign. These results provide evidence that countries that have an early 
transition to agriculture, a well-established polity and early experience with large-scale public 
administration, early achievement of technological superiority, greater accessibility to the frontiers’ 
technologies due to lower geographical barriers or genetic differentiation, and the emergence of populous 
societies in the early days enjoyed greater prosperity and are associated with a better quality of institutions 
today.  
The first-stage F-test statistics on the excluded instrument, which has the null hypothesis that a 
particular PMD measure does not explain cross-country variations in institutions, provide evidence that all 
but one PMD measures are strong and valid instruments. In particular,                       , which is 
found to be the best instrument, is able to explain more than one third of the variations in current institutions. 
Its F-statistic on the excluded instrument is also six times larger than the size of the usual rule of thumb of 
10. Although                        is a very useful instrument, its focus on technological development 
alone is too narrow for our purpose of investigating the effect of early development in 1500 AD on current 
income via institutions. In light of this, we also choose              , which is an encompassing measure 
capturing several distinct dimensions of historical development, as an instrument for institutions in our 
remaining analyses.  
The Wooldridge robust score test provides a test of endogeneity under the null hypothesis that a 
particular variable can be treated as exogenous. As is evident, this rejects the null hypothesis that 
institutional development is exogenous at conventional significance levels in nearly all cases, thus 
supporting the notion that institutions should be treated as endogenous and the use of instrumental variable 
techniques is appropriate here.  
 
4. Robustness of Results 
4.1 Tests of exclusion restrictions 
 Our identification strategy rests on the premise that the PMD measures have no direct statistical 
effect on income today other than through their effect on institutions. Under this condition, the reverse 
causality running from output to institutional development, measurement errors associated with institutions, 
(16) 
  
and unobserved omitted variable bias would no longer pose any issue. However, we still need to establish 
that our identification strategy is valid. This can be verified using over-identification tests, which provide a 
direct examination of our exclusion restriction. The validity of our identification strategy will be rejected if 
PMD has a direct effect on current income (i.e., PMD is correlated with residuals) or PMD has an indirect 
effect on current income that works through a channel other than institutions.  
To pursue this strategy, we require additional instruments since our model is exactly identified. The 
literature has established that settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), tropical endowments (Easterly and 
Levine, 2003), the fraction of population speaking a major European language as first language (Hall and 
Jones, 1999), and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Mauro, 1995) significantly explain institutional 
development. The tests of over-identifying restrictions will be performed under the assumption that the 
additional instruments are truly exogenous and test for the exogeneity of the PMD measures. These tests not 
only examine whether our instruments are correlated with the error term, but also provide a mechanism to 
check whether the structural equation is correctly specified, in that the excluded exogenous variables should 
in fact be included in the structural equation.  
 Results of these exclusion restriction tests are reported in Table 2. In each regression we use one 
instrument of institutions considered in previous work along with one of our preferred PMD measures, i.e., 
                      or              . Overall, the results support our notion that the effect of PMD on 
income works through institutions. In Panel A, we report the 2SLS estimates of the effect of institutions on 
per capita GDP. The results are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 1. All coefficients of 
institutions are both economically and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating a very strong 
correlation between institutions and current income. 
 Panel B gives the corresponding first-stage estimates. Consistent with our previous results, all 
coefficients of                       or               are highly significant. The additional instruments are 
also very precisely estimated and have the right signs. If these additional instruments are determined by 
early historical development, then including                      or               would render itself 
insignificant. There is no evidence to suggest that these variables are highly correlated, thus strengthening 
the credibility of the tests of over-identifying restrictions. The results show that the PMD measures are able 
to provide some differential power in explaining variation in institutions, and are thus complementary to 
other instruments of institutions established in the literature.  
 Panel C includes                       and               as an exogenous regressor. The underlying 
principle of this test is simple. If a PMD indicator has a direct effect on current income, we would expect its 
coefficient to be positive and significant. On the other hand, if it is found to be statistically insignificant, 
then it is established that early historical development affects income today via institutions. The results give 
(17) 
  
credence to our approach that measures of PMD are valid instruments for institutions, and that the effect of 
PMD on income works through institutions.  
 
Table 2: Exclusion restriction tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates with two instruments 
     5.69*** 5.42*** 5.39*** 5.33*** 5.78*** 5.44*** 5.53*** 5.47*** 
 (0.73) (0.49) (0.44) (0.43) (0.81) (0.54) (0.55) (0.49) 
R-squared 0.519 0.567 0.633 0.646 0.508 0.564 0.616 0.629 
Dep. Var. =      Panel B: 1st-stage results 
                      0.34*** 0.47*** 0.66*** 0.54***     
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)     
                  0.07** 0.08** 0.14*** 0.09*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
                     -0.07***    -0.07**    
  (0.02)    (0.03)    
                      -0.17***    -0.22***   
  (0.06)    (0.06)   
                    0.13**    0.13**  
                     (0.06)    (0.06)  
                   -0.23**    -0.35*** 
                     (0.10)    (0.10) 
R-squared 0.390 0.407 0.448 0.437 0.362 0.349 0.349 0.375 
F-test on excluded 
instrument 
19.788 
[0.000] 
37.811 
[0.000] 
42.773 
[0.000] 
46.154 
[0.000] 
16.991 
[0.000] 
27.873 
[0.000] 
25.278 
[0.000] 
35.582 
[0.000] 
Endogeneity test 
(Wooldridge’s score) 
8.194 
[0.004] 
14.286 
[0.000] 
15.495 
[0.000] 
12.672 
[0.000] 
7.477 
[0.006] 
12.581 
[0.000] 
12.927 
[0.000] 
12.492 
[0.000] 
Observations 66 97 93 94 66 97 93 94 
Dep. Var. =     Panel C: 2SLS estimates treating                       or               as exogenous 
     6.53*** 4.69*** 5.35*** 5.39*** 6.44*** 4.62*** 5.13*** 4.84*** 
 (1.82) (1.19) (1.75) (1.86) (1.89) (0.95) (1.70) (1.08) 
                      -0.61 0.56 0.04 -0.05     
 (1.10) (0.83) (1.31) (1.40)     
                   -0.12 0.16 0.07 0.12 
     (0.30) (0.17) (0.28) (0.19) 
R-squared 0.397 0.660 0.639 0.639 0.407 0.668 0.665 0.700 
 Panel D: Over-identification tests 
Wooldridge’s robust 
score test 
0.398 
[0.528] 
0.341 
[0.559] 
0.001 
[0.977] 
0.001 
[0.974] 
0.214 
[0.644] 
0.653 
[0.419] 
0.052 
[0.818] 
0.314 
[0.575] 
Sargan’s test 
0.413 
[0.520] 
0.302 
[0.583] 
0.001 
[0.978] 
0.001 
[0.972] 
0.229 
[0.632] 
0.786 
[0.375] 
0.052 
[0.819] 
0.415 
[0.519] 
Notes: A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Figures in round parentheses are robust standard errors whereas 
those in square brackets are p-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel D reports results of the over-identification tests. This procedure tests whether the 2SLS 
coefficients estimated by using only those instruments of institutions established in literature are 
significantly different from those estimated using the PMD measures in addition to these instruments. The 
hypothesis that they are equal is never rejected at the conventional levels of significance, providing no 
(18) 
  
evidence that PMD has a direct effect on income or has an effect on income that works through a variable 
other than institutions.  
 Notwithstanding the above findings, the possibility that different causal mechanisms are involved 
cannot be ruled out, which would invalidate our identifying assumption. Historical factors may be 
associated with current economic performance because they directly shape the evolution of institutional 
development and hence indirectly influence economic development, as proposed and tested in this paper. In 
contrast, they may also have a direct influence on economic development, which in turn affects institutional 
development. The latter is in line with the modernization hypothesis of Lipset (1959), who proposes that 
institutional change is initiated by economic development. In fact, Persson and Tabellini (2009) suggest a 
complex interactive relationship between institutions and economic development. They argue that the 
accumulation of democratic experience increases the rates of return on investment that favors economic 
development, and this creates a positive feedback loop through facilitating further democratic consolidation.  
 While the possibility that economic development leads to better institutional outcomes cannot be 
discounted, there are reasons to believe that this causal chain is less plausible. In particular, the empirical 
results of Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) clearly show that institutions are very persistent whereas income is 
not. Hence, it is more plausible that history affects the formation of early institutions, which persist and 
influence subsequent institutional development. Although the results in this paper do not provide any 
conclusive evidence to suggest that the opposite channel is not operative, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) 
provide clear empirical evidence to suggest the lack of a causal effect of income on democracy, once 
country fixed effects that may capture the impact of time invariant unobserved historical differences or 
historical factors are taken into account. Their findings suggest that the positive correlation between income 
and democracy is due to historical events that affect both variables and result in different development 
trajectories, thus providing no support for the modernization view of Lipset (1959). 
 Indeed, when we regress institutions on per capita GDP in 1970 and instrument the latter with our 
composite index of early development, while controlling for regional dummies, we find no statistically 
significant impact of the exogenous component of income, isolated by history factors, on current institutions 
(results are not reported). The results prevail when the rate of technology adoption is used instead. Hence, in 
line with Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009), our findings also provide evidence in favor of the notion that history 
affects income via institutions, but none to support the modernization view.  
 
4.2 Controlling for other effects 
 Our identification strategy rests on the premise that the PMD indicators are valid instruments for 
institutions, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of current economic performance 
(19) 
  
in the output regression. Hence, identification is achieved as long as historical development has no direct 
effect on income. Although the tests of over-identifying restrictions suggest that this is the case, this channel 
of causation remains a rather strong assumption, as we cannot rule out the possibility that PMD has an 
effect on cultural norms or education, rather than current institutions, which could affect output and hence 
violate exclusion restrictions (see Glaeser et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2010). Hence, to ensure that our model is 
not picking up this channel of causation, we control for these effects in the regressions to relax our 
identifying assumption.  
 Column (1) in Table 3 adds measures of religious composition and treats them as exogenous 
variables to capture the influence of culture and trust on current income (see Stulz and Williamson, 2003). 
Religious composition is measured as the proportion of the population that practices Catholic, Islam or other 
religions, with Protestants as the omitted group, in each country. The results show that the coefficients of 
institutions are still very precisely estimated, regardless of which measure of PMD is used. Moreover, 
coefficients of the PMD measures in the first-stage regressions remain highly significant, suggesting a weak 
correlation between early development and cultural norms. Similar results are obtained when we add the 
average years of schooling in 1960 as a control variable in column (2).  
 Our results may also be biased since the econometric specification is parsimonious where the 
analyses have been performed without including other factors which could be correlated with PMD and 
account for the estimated influence of institutions on current income. Thus, in the next three columns, we 
control for the effects of early institutions (column (3)), legal origins (column (4)) and geography (column 
(5)) to reduce the risk of having invalid instruments. We use Polity 2 in the first year of independence as a 
measure of early institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2002). The legal tradition of the company law or 
commercial code for each country is classified into French, German, Scandinavian or Socialist using 
dummy variables with English as the omitted group. The influence of geographic endowments is captured 
by absolute latitude, island dummy, landlockedness dummy, and terrain ruggedness. Moreover, continents 
dummies are also added to the regressions in column (6) to capture the potential effects of unobserved 
continent specific heterogeneity due to historical differences.  
  Finally, in column (7) all control variables are added together to account for their joint influence. 
These considerations, however, have little effect on our key findings. These regressions perform reasonably 
well in that the sign and significance of the coefficients on institutions remain stable across models, 
implying that the relationship uncovered is not sensitive to the inclusion of these control variables. In all 
cases, our instruments remain significant in the first-stage regressions. Above all, our key findings that the 
disparity in current income can be explained by the exogenous variation in institutions remain unchanged, 
suggesting that the previous findings are robust.  
(20) 
  
 
Table 3: Adding control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Add 
cultures 
Add human 
capital 
Add early 
institutions 
Add legal 
traditions 
Add 
geography 
Add 
continents 
Add all 
controls 
 Panel A:               instrumented by                       
     5.570*** 6.816*** 5.416*** 5.811*** 7.377*** 6.034*** 5.115*** 
 (0.516) (1.532) (0.466) (0.626) (1.868) (1.643) (1.782) 
           [0.005]       
                [0.265]      
                  [0.144]     
                  [0.003]    
               [0.054]   
                 [0.245]  
                    [0.000] 
R-squared 0.619 0.398 0.597 0.602 0.334 0.534 0.727 
 Panel B: 1
st
-stage results 
                      0.675*** 0.369*** 0.710*** 0.619*** 0.316*** 0.463*** 0.425*** 
 (0.080) (0.095) (0.087) (0.092) (0.114) (0.133) (0.151) 
R-squared 0.583 0.552 0.382 0.530 0.507 0.521 0.731 
 Panel C:               instrumented by               
     5.448*** 6.719*** 5.573*** 5.951*** 7.880*** 6.231*** 4.339*** 
 (0.539) (1.457) (0.588) (0.757) (2.873) (2.330) (1.349) 
           [0.006]       
                [0.261]      
                  [0.155]     
                  [0.007]    
               [0.075]   
                 [0.354]  
                    [0.000] 
R-squared 0.632 0.414 0.574 0.585 0.227 0.505 0.771 
 Panel D: 1
st
-stage results 
               0.166*** 0.087*** 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.058* 0.082** 0.117*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) 
R-squared 0.554 0.554 0.287 0.476 0.493 0.490 0.739 
Notes: The total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. 
Figures in round parentheses are robust standard errors whereas those in square brackets are p-values. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The religion variables, which proxy the effects of cultural norms, are 
percentage of the population of each country that belonged to Protestant, Muslim or other religions (Catholic is the base group). 
Human capital is measured as the average years of total schooling in 1960. The presence of early institutions is captured by Polity 
2 in the first year of independence. Legal origins are measured using dummy variables that identify the legal tradition of a country 
as French, German, Scandinavia or Socialist with British as the omitted group. Geography variables include dummies for 
islandness, landlockedness, absolute latitude, and terrain ruggedness. Dummies for Asia, Africa, America and Europe (Oceania is 
the excluded group) are included to capture continent effects. These controls are also included in the first-stage regressions but 
not reported to conserve space. 
 
 Figure 4 presents the scatter plots of the orthogonalized residuals for institutional quality and the two 
ancestry-adjusted measures of PMD, while controlling for the influence of all control variables considered 
above. In other words, these scatter plots are obtained based on the regression results of column (7) in Table 
3. As an illustration, in the left diagram, the vertical axis plots the residuals obtained by regressing 
(21) 
  
institutions on both a constant and all control variables. The horizontal axis reflects the residuals obtained 
from regressing technology adoption (ancestry-adjusted) on an intercept and all controls. As is evident, 
these scatter plots and the associated partial regression lines support the notion that                       
and               are robust predictors of current institutions, confirming the above findings. 
 
Figure 4: Partial effects of ancestry-adjusted PMD measures on institutions  
  
Notes: the above scatter plots illustrate the effects of ancestry-adjusted technology adoption or the 1
st
 principal component of all 
PMD measures on institutions while partialing out the effects of all control variables. These partial regression lines are obtained 
based on regressions of panel B and panel D, respectively, in the last column of Table 3.  
 
4.3 Other sensitivity checks 
This subsection performs several further checks to establish the robustness of our results. Firstly, the 
analyses so far have been based on the World Bank data of Kaufmann et al. (2010), who provide one of the 
most commonly used measures of institutions in the literature. It would be interesting to inquire whether the 
same findings are obtained when other common measures of institutions such as the social infrastructure 
index and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index are used. The social infrastructure index of 
Hall and Jones (1999) is measured as the simple average of Sachs and Warner's (1995) trade openness index 
during the period 1950-1994 and Knack and Keefer's (1995) index of country risk to international investors 
over the period 1986-1995. The ICRG composite index of Knack and Keefer (1995) is based on several 
survey indicators of institutional quality, including risk of expropriation, rule of law, repudiation of 
contracts by government, corruption, and quality of bureaucracy. The data are collected over the 1980s and 
1990s. Both variables are averaged over all their available years and rescaled to take values ranging from 0 
to 1 where higher values correspond to having better institutional quality. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
regression results when the Kaufmann et al. (2010) institutional index is replaced with other measures of 
institutional quality. On the whole, the findings herein are consistent with the core results obtained 
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previously, lending credence to the argument that the estimates are not sensitive to the use of alternative 
institutions measures. 
   
Table 4: Other robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     is social 
infrastructure 
    is 
ICRG 
index 
Dep. var. is 
income 
growth 
Dep. var. is 
TFP 
Exclude 
Neo-
Europes 
Exclude 
Africa 
Instrument 
is PMD in 
1 AD 
 Panel A:               instrumented by                       
     6.297*** 7.703*** 14.841*** 2.329*** 5.635*** 4.295*** 4.751*** 
 (0.655) (0.697) (3.353) (0.355) (0.538) (0.398) (1.036) 
              -2.621***     
   (0.678)     
R-squared 0.499 0.583 0.001 0.184 0.539 0.760 0.650 
 Panel B: 1
st
-stage results 
                      0.728*** 0.748*** 0.732*** 0.725*** 0.660*** 0.956*** 0.501*** 
 (0.088) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) (0.130) (0.160) 
R-squared 0.424 0.477 0.432 0.426 0.356 0.367 0.091 
 Panel C:               instrumented by               
     6.510*** 8.606*** 19.775** 2.840*** 5.847*** 4.113*** 6.076*** 
 (0.804) (0.994) (8.143) (0.480) (0.697) (0.477) (0.963) 
              -3.563**     
   (1.560)     
R-squared 0.464 0.469 0.001 0.001 0.504 0.775 0.460 
 Panel D: 1
st
-stage results 
               0.157*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.220*** 0.067*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.044) (0.017) 
R-squared 0.322 0.320 0.309 0.326 0.259 0.241 0.155 
Observations 89 81 92 88 96 66 81 
Notes: A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Secondly, although the literature on long-run comparative development tends to focus mostly on 
forces explaining the differences in income levels, it would be interesting to investigate how early 
development influences growth rates and total factor productivity (TFP). These estimates are provided in 
columns (3) and (4), respectively. The dependent variable in column (3) is the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita from 1970 to 2005. Initial GDP per capita in 1970 is included as a regressor to allow for convergence 
effects. Column (4) replaces income levels with the TFP measure of Hall and Jones (1999). It is evident that 
the exogenous variations in institutions also positively affect growth and TFP. Similar to the previous 
findings, these estimates are also found to be highly significant.   
 Next, our results may be driven by the inclusion of the New World and Africa in the sample. In 
column (5), we rerun the regressions without Canada, New Zealand and the United States (Australia is not 
included in our sample) which were once dominated by the Europeans who settled and introduced good 
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quality of institutions. The results, again, remain fairly stable. In column (6), we repeat our basic regression 
by excluding countries in the African region, which have the worst institutions. While dropping all African 
countries makes the coefficients on institutions smaller, they are more precisely estimated. On the whole, 
these estimates provide very similar qualitative results to those obtained earlier, suggesting that our 
estimates are fairly robust to these alternative estimation strategies.  
 Finally, we measure all indicators of PMD in 1 AD to check if development so long ago can still 
influence current income through affecting institutional outcomes. These variables are constructed in the 
same manner as those measured in 1500 AD. However, data on the composition of population in 1 AD are 
not available. We therefore continue to use the 1500 AD genetic distance data and assume that the 
population mixes in 1 AD were not significantly different from those in 1500 AD – before the major 
population movements began. In this case, Italy is chosen as the global technology leader instead of the UK. 
While coefficients of the early development measures and the R-squared values in the first-stage regressions 
are both unsurprisingly smaller than those found in the baseline results, the effects of history on institutions 
as well as institutions on income remain very precisely estimated at the 1% level.  
 
5. Further Analyses 
 This section performs some additional analyses by considering the individual components of the 
aggregate index of institutions and aggregate index of technology adoption. The Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
overall index of institutional quality is constructed based on six individual components. It would be 
interesting to gain some further insight into how the individual components of the overall institutions index 
are related to indicators of early development. As is evident in the size of their first-stage estimates and 
first-stage R-squared values, the results in Table 5 show that the measures of early historical development 
are most strongly correlated with the rule of law index (column (3)) and the government effectiveness index 
(column (6)), suggesting that these are the most effective channels through which early development 
impacts institutions.  
 Moreover, to shed some light on adoption of which type of technology is most effective in shaping 
institutional development, we use the individual components of the aggregate technology adoption index as 
instruments in the instrumental variable estimations. These sectors include agriculture, transportation, 
communications, industry and military. Table 6 provides the results of this exercise. Technological 
superiority in any of the five sectors considered is found to have a significant positive effect on institutional 
development, reinforcing our previous findings that a higher adoption rate of technology in early 
development is central for improving subsequent institutional environments. Specifically, higher adoption 
(24) 
  
rates in transportation and communication technologies are found to be most strongly related to better 
quality of institutions today.  
 
Table 5: Sub-components of institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A:               instrumented by                       
                           6.477***      
 (0.829)      
                          6.246***     
  (0.745)     
                   4.997***    
   (0.447)    
                               5.378***   
    (0.522)   
                            5.787***  
     (0.530)  
                                   5.065*** 
      (0.429) 
R-squared 0.111 0.229 0.577 0.501 0.511 0.652 
 Panel B: 1
st
-stage results 
Dep. Var. = VA PS RL CC RQ GE 
                      0.590*** 0.612*** 0.765*** 0.711*** 0.661*** 0.755*** 
 (6.233) (6.336) (8.545) (7.654) (7.556) (8.564) 
R-squared 0.259 0.298 0.412 0.357 0.326 0.411 
Dep. Var. =     Panel C:               instrumented by                
                           6.861***      
 (1.073)      
                          6.947***     
  (1.084)     
                   5.008***    
   (0.535)    
                               5.465***   
    (0.639)   
                            5.917***  
     (0.656)  
                                   5.142*** 
      (0.516) 
R-squared 0.001 0.039 0.576 0.486 0.486 0.642 
 Panel D: 1
st
-stage results 
Dep. Var. = VA PS RL CC RQ GE 
              0.127*** 0.125*** 0.174*** 0.159*** 0.147*** 0.169*** 
 (4.665) (4.494) (6.322) (5.557) (5.684) (6.296) 
R-squared 0.184 0.192 0.326 0.276 0.248 0.318 
Notes: The total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
   
 
(25) 
  
Table 6: Individual components of technology adoption in 1500 AD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
     6.007*** 5.037*** 6.028*** 5.599*** 5.396*** 
 (1.035) (0.397) (0.682) (0.508) (0.572) 
R-squared 0.490 0.634 0.486 0.561 0.590 
Dep. Var. =     Panel B: 1st-stage results 
                             0.391***     
 (0.116)     
                               0.565***    
  (0.066)    
                                   0.616***   
   (0.086)   
                            0.513***  
    (0.063)  
                               0.519*** 
     (0.083) 
R-squared 0.113 0.435 0.281 0.349 0.251 
Notes: The total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  
6. Conclusions 
 Recent contributions in the literature on long-run comparative development have often highlighted 
the importance of historical factors in shaping current economic performance. Since these findings are 
largely based on reduced-form estimations, they do not depend on any specific identifying assumption. We 
hypothesized in this paper that the correlation between history and current performance reflects the effect of 
early development working through some channels, and the most plausible one is institutions. Hence, our 
identification strategy is based on the premise that differences in early development could be a source of 
exogenous variations in institutions and we exploited these differences to estimate the causal effect of 
institutions on current income. We used measures of the timing of agricultural transition, the length of 
statehood, the adoption rates of primitive technology, geographical and genetic proximity to the frontiers, 
and population density, as well as their first principal component, to capture different aspects of PMD. 
These indicators were adjusted by the places of origin of the ancestors of each country’s population to allow 
for the possibility that the diffusion of innovation and knowledge via the channel of cross-border labor 
movements has also played an important role in shaping institutions.  
 Our results indicate that the exogenous component of institutions due to early development is a 
significant determinant of current output, supporting the notion that the channel running from early 
development to income largely goes through institutions. While all these historical factors are found to be 
important in understanding cross-country variations in the present-day quality of institutions, our results 
(26) 
  
indicate that the technology adoption rate in 1500 AD and the composite index of all indicators have the 
strongest predictive power. Our results also show that measures adjusted for the global migration effect 
perform significantly better than their unadjusted counterparts in explaining the variations in institutions 
across countries, thus highlighting the fact that migration has played a significant part in shaping current 
economic performance. 
 In principle, historical development could affect current income other than through institutions, and 
if this occurs, identification of our model will not be achieved. To establish the robustness of our results, we 
conduct exclusion restriction tests and control for a number of potential omitted variables. However, the 
robustness of the relationship between institutions and income to the inclusion of these control variables and 
the fact that indicators of PMD turn out to be statistically insignificant when treated as an exogenous 
variable in the second-stage regressions provide supporting evidence to the hypothesis that the effect of 
historical development on current income largely works through institutions. The finding of an important 
channel running from early development to institutions and then to income provides supporting evidence for 
the proposition of  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). 
 The results are also qualitatively robust to considering different indicators of institutional quality, 
using income growth and total factor productivity as alternative dependent variables, excluding the Neo-
Europes and African countries, and measuring pre-modern development in 1 AD instead of 1500 AD. 
Results of our further analyses suggest that the largest effect of early development on institutions works 
through the channels of the rule of law and government effectiveness. In addition, transportation and 
communications are the most influential sectors of ancient technology that facilitate institutional capacity 
building.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Definition of variables and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
Income levels GDP per capita in 2005 converted to constant 2005 
international dollars using PPP rates. 
World Development Indicators 
(2012) 
Institutional quality The averaged ranking score of the following World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: voice and accountability, 
political stability, rule of law, control for corruption, 
regulatory quality and government effectiveness (average of 
1996-2005 and scaled to 0 and 1). 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
Years since agricultural 
transition 
The number of years elapsed, in 1500 AD, since the transition 
to agriculture was estimated to occur (in thousand years). 
Putterman (2006) 
State antiquity An index of state history covering the period from 1 AD to 
1500 AD, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. More 
detailed description on its construction is provided in the 
main text. 
Putterman (2004) 
Technology adoption The average adoption rate of technology in 1500 AD. It 
covers the following sectors: agriculture, transportation, 
communications, industry and military. 
Comin et al. (2010) 
Geographical proximity 
to the regional frontier 
Geographical distance is calculated using the ‘Haversine’ 
formula, which calculates the shortest distance between two 
points on the surface of a sphere based on their longitudes 
and latitudes. Geographical proximity to the regional frontier 
of a country from one of its two frontiers in the same 
continent is calculated as:    
            
           
  where 
              is the geographical distance between country 
  and its regional frontier    and              is the 
maximum distance in the sample. The frontiers are identified 
based on their population density (measured as the population 
divided by land area) in 1500 AD.     
Author’s own calculation. Population 
and land area data are from  
McEvedy and Jones (1978) and 
World Development Indicators 
(2012).   
Genetic proximity to the 
global frontier 
The degree of genealogical similarities or historical 
relatedness for the population of a particular country relative 
to that of the technological frontier in 1500 AD, i.e., the UK. 
It is measured as    
      
      
 , where        is the fixation 
index reflecting the genetic distance between population of 
country   and population of the UK and        is the largest 
genetic distance in the sample. Data on populations are 
matched to countries based on their ethnic composition as of 
1500 AD. 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
Population density The population divided by land area. McEvedy and Jones (1978) and 
World Development Indicators 
(2012).  
Global migration matrix A matrix that provides the estimated proportions of where the 
ancestors of each country’s current population were living in 
1500 AD. 
Putterman and Weil (2010) 
Settler mortality rate European settler mortality rates in the 19th century. Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
(30) 
  
Percentage of population 
in tropics 
The percentage of the population of each country living in 
tropical climate areas. 
Gallup et al. (2010) 
Percentage of population 
speaking European 
language 
The fraction of the population speaking major European 
languages as first languages. 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
An index capturing the extent of ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity within the population. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Religion variables Percentage of the population of each country that belonged to 
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim or others in 1980 (or 1990-95 
for countries formed more recently). 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Human capital The average years of total schooling for population aged 25 
and above in 1960. 
Barro and Lee (2010) 
First polity The index value of Polity 2 during the first year of 
independence or the start date of a new regime. 
Marshall and Jaggers (2010) 
Legal origins Dummy variables that identify the legal tradition of the 
company law or commercial code of a country as British, 
French, German or Scandinavian. 
La Porta et al. (2008) 
Island  A dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is an island and 0 
otherwise. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
Landlocked  A dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is fully enclosed 
by land and 0 otherwise.  
Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of a country. La Porta et al. (1999) 
Terrain ruggedness An index that quantifies small-scale terrain irregularities in 
each country.  
Nunn and Puga (2012) 
Social infrastructure The simple average of Sachs and Warner's (1995) trade 
openness index during the period 1950-1994 and Knack and 
Keefer's (1995) index of country risk to international 
investors over the period 1986-1995. 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
ICRG index A composite index based on several survey indicators of 
institutional quality, including the risk of expropriation, the 
rule of law, repudiation of contracts by the government, 
corruption, and the quality of bureaucracy. The data are 
collected over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) 
 
 
Income growth Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita World Development Indicators 
(2012) 
TFP Total factor productivity  Hall and Jones (1999) 
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Table A2: Summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP per capita (logs) 99 8.578 1.339 5.612 10.771 
Institutions index 99 0.485 0.286 0.023 1.000 
Years of agricultural transition  99 4.725 1.960 0.857 9.873 
State history index 99 0.450 0.267 0.000 1.000 
Technology adoption index 99 0.602 0.251 0.133 0.991 
Geographical proximity index 99 0.693 0.208 0.000 1.000 
Genetic proximity index 99 0.630 0.282 0.000 1.000 
Population density  99 8.783 8.975 0.328 46.639 
1
st
 principal component (standardized) 99 0.000 1.000 -2.395 1.644 
Notes: the 1
st
 principal component is constructed based on the following six standardized measures of pre-modern development in 
1500 AD: 1) the timing of agricultural transition (          ), 2) state history (           ), 3) technology adoption 
(           ), 4) geographical proximity to the regional frontier (         .), 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier 
(             ), and 6) population density (        ). See descriptions in the text for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
 
 
Table A3: Correlation structure of the variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1)      1.00         
(2)      0.83*** 1.00        
(3)                      0.43*** 0.27*** 1.00       
(4)                      0.43*** 0.31*** 0.67*** 1.00      
(5)                       0.72*** 0.61*** 0.71*** 0.68*** 1.00     
(6)                      0.42*** 0.35*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.50*** 1.00    
(7)                         0.60*** 0.49*** 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.81*** 0.56*** 1.00   
(8)                    0.48*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.31*** 0.50*** 1.00  
(9)               0.64*** 0.53*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 0.72*** 0.86*** 0.67*** 1.00 
Notes: the 1
st
 principal component is constructed based on the following six standardized measures of pre-modern development in 
1500 AD: 1) the timing of agricultural transition (         ), 2) state history (           ), 3) technology adoption 
(           ), 4) geographical proximity to the regional frontier (         .), 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier 
(             ), and 6) population density (        ). See descriptions in the text for detailed descriptions of all variables. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table A4: Instrumental variable regressions based on unadjusted pre-modern development indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
     10.920 7.309*** 5.393*** 7.143** 5.603*** 4.075*** 5.874*** 
 (7.534) (2.577) (0.753) (2.932) (0.792) (0.465) (0.971) 
R-squared 0.000 0.164 0.591 0.214 0.560 0.691 0.515 
Dep. Var. =     Panel B: 1st-stage results 
         . 0.014       
 (0.014)       
             0.142      
  (0.090)      
               0.351***     
   (0.087)     
          .    0.199    
    (0.127)    
                   0.418***   
     (0.092)   
               0.012***  
      (0.003)  
           0.097*** 
       (0.029) 
R-squared 0.011 0.025 0.148 0.024 0.181 0.149 0.112 
F-test on excluded 
instrument  
0.971 
[0.327] 
2.491 
[0.118] 
16.304 
[0.000] 
2.448 
[0.121] 
20.477 
[0.000] 
20.524 
[0.000] 
11.391 
[0.001] 
Notes: the results in this table provide evidence that the unadjusted measures of pre-modern development (PMD) have relatively 
low predictive power on subsequent institutional development, given that only about half of the PMD measures are statistically 
significant and fulfil the condition of being good instruments.     is the first principal component of the following standardized 
measures of pre-modern development, all of which are measured as of 1500 AD: 1) the timing of agricultural transition 
(         ), 2) state history (          ), 3) technology adoption (           ), 4) geographical proximity to the regional 
frontier (         .), 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier (             ), and 6) population density (        ). The 
total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Figures in round 
parentheses are robust standard errors whereas those in square brackets are p-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5: Instrumental variable regressions for adjusted versus unadjusted pre-modern development 
indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
     6.265*** 6.079*** 5.533*** 5.042*** 5.663*** 4.475*** 5.655*** 
 (0.956) (0.900) (0.493) (0.717) (0.700) (0.429) (0.611) 
R-squared 0.438 0.476 0.571 0.633 0.551 0.677 0.552 
Dep. Var. =     Panel B: 1st-stage results 
         . -0.062***       
 (0.020)       
                     0.095***       
 (0.019)       
             -0.288**      
  (0.128)      
                       0.617***      
  (0.147)      
               -0.118     
   (0.100)     
                         0.800***     
   (0.120)     
          .    -0.612***    
    (0.120)    
                         1.027***    
    (0.158)    
                   -0.104   
     (0.189)   
                            0.597***   
     (0.185)   
               -0.007  
      (0.005)  
                         0.023***  
      (0.006)  
           -0.058 
       (0.037) 
                     0.199*** 
       (0.037) 
R-squared 0.131 0.129 0.379 0.186 0.246 0.279 0.293 
F-test on excluded 
instrument  
13.029 
[0.000] 
9.719 
[0.000] 
32.574 
[0.000] 
23.478 
[0.000] 
15.661 
[0.000] 
17.254 
[0.000] 
19.072 
[0.000] 
Notes: the results in this table provide evidence that the ancestry-adjusted measures of pre-modern development (PMD) 
indicators are far superior to their unadjusted counterparts in explaining the variation in institutional quality across countries. 
When institutions are regressed on both the original PMD measure and its ancestry-adjusted counterpart in each regression, only 
the coefficients of the adjusted measures are found to have both economic and statistical significance.     is the first principal 
component of the following standardized measures of pre-modern development, all of which are measured as of 1500 AD: 1) the 
timing of agricultural transition (         ), 2) state history (           ), 3) technology adoption (           ), 4) 
geographical proximity to the regional frontier (         .), 5) genetic proximity to the global frontier (             ), and 6) 
population density (        ). Variables marked with the superscript “        ” are pre-modern development indicators 
adjusted for the effects of global migration using the migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010). The total number of 
observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Figures in round parentheses are 
robust standard errors whereas those in square brackets are p-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table A6: Horserace for various (standardized) pre-modern development measures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. =     Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
     0.994*** 1.101*** 1.178*** 0.997*** 1.099*** 
 (14.721) (12.780) (11.011) (10.060) (12.991) 
R-squared 0.666 0.620 0.573 0.665 0.621 
Dep. Var. = INS Panel B: 1st-stage results 
         . -0.359***     
 (-3.559)     
            -0.237**     
 (-2.352)     
             0.776*** 0.449*** 0.582***  0.468*** 
 (5.672) (4.559) (7.571)  (4.650) 
          . -0.032     
 (-0.233)     
               0.193* 0.040 0.054 0.205**  
 (1.827) (0.387) (0.495) (2.031)  
          0.333*** 0.258**  0.450*** 0.260** 
 (3.744) (2.589)  (5.210) (2.598) 
R-squared 0.524 0.420 0.373 0.303 0.419 
F-test on excluded 
instrument  
25.409 
[0.000] 
30.744 
[0.000] 
33.691 
[0.000] 
22.008 
[0.000] 
42.336 
[0.000] 
Notes: unlike results reported in all other tables, standardized pre-modern development (PMD) measures are used here so that 
magnitudes of the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of standard deviation to gauge the relative importance of each PMD 
indicators. The first principal component is not used here since it is a linear combination of all six PMD measures. The results 
clearly suggest that technology adoption and population density have the strongest predictive power among all PMD measures, 
and that technology adoption is both economically and statistically more significant than population density in predicting 
institutional improvements. The total number of observations is 99 in all regressions. A constant is included in the regressions but 
not reported. Robust standard errors are used. Figures in round parentheses are t-statistics whereas those in square brackets are p-
values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
